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Abstract
The Spanish government created the Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria
(FROB), known in English as the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) in 2009 to
perform temporary capital injections that facilitated the restructuring and mergers and
acquisitions of struggling institutions. The FROB used preferred shares, ordinary shares,
and contingent convertible bonds to recapitalize struggling Spanish credit institutions. The
FROB injected a total of €54.4 billion of capital in three rounds. FROB I in 2010 injected
capital to support the mergers of 25 insolvent regional savings banks, or cajas, into seven
larger, more solvent banks through the subscription of convertible preferred shares. FROB
II in 2011–12 recapitalized struggling banks, including three of those seven merged banks,
using ordinary shares. FROB III in 2012–13 recapitalized banks that had failed a stress test
by subscribing shares and purchasing contingent convertible bonds. In 2012, the
government gave FROB resolution powers and created an asset management company,
Sareb, of which FROB owns 45%. As of December 2018, the FROB still was holding shares
of a number of institutions. The FROB’s timely capital injections helped capitalize Spanish
banks and prevent a systemically damaging insolvency, but it had incurred losses as of the
end of 2018.
Keywords: capital injections, FROB, Global Financial Crisis, Sareb, Spain, recapitalizations,
resolution

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to broad-based capital injection
programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Spain – Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada
Bancaria (FROB) Capital Injections
At a Glance
Spanish banks experienced substantial losses on real estate loans during the global
financial crisis in 2009. Concerns about
regional savings banks, or cajas, and their
Summary of Key Terms
exposure to real estate were realized in
Purpose: FROB made capital injections to restructure
the failure of Caja Castilla-La Mancha. This
credit institutions that could not independently
spurred the Spanish government to create
address their weaknesses and reinforce the
resources of credit institutions participating in
the Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada
mergers and acquisitions. It later executed the
Bancaria (FROB), known in English as the
resolution processes of failing credit institutions and
Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring.
investment firms.
In 2010, the FROB subscribed preferred
Announcement Date
June 27, 2009
shares in many cajas, facilitating their
mergers and sales, which resulted in
Operational Date
June 27, 2009
larger, more stable, and more solvent
institutions. This set of injections is known
End of Issuance Window
No explicit window
as FROB I. The passage of Royal Decreelaw 2/2011 allowed the FROB to
Initial: Royal DecreeLegal Authority
law 9/2009
recapitalize insolvent institutions through
the purchase of ordinary shares. The
Current: Law 11/2015
FROB could also require them to submit
plans to maintain compliance with capital
€ 54.4 billion (BdE
Peak Utilization
requirements. Injections made in 2011–12
2017a, 237)
adhered to this law and Spain’s new
Participants
Several
capital requirements, and constituted
FROB II. In 2012, the Spanish government
Bank of Spain; deposit
Administrators
gave the FROB powers to restructure
guarantee funds;
banks via the purchase of contingent
Ministry of Economy
convertible securities (CoCos) as well as
and Finance
preferred and ordinary shares. Spain also
made FROB a resolution authority and established Sareb, an asset management company
or “bad bank.” These policies were pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
between Spain and the European Commission, which recommended plans for resolution
and troubled asset purchases in Spain’s financial stability framework. The MoU required an
independent consultant to perform a stress test on major Spanish banks and group them
into categories of solvency. The FROB made a series of capital injections into banks that
failed this stress test in 2012–13 (FROB III), using shares and CoCos.
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Summary Evaluation
The FROB ultimately made €54.4 billion in capital injections, on which it posted losses of
€42.6 billion as of the end of 2018 (Appendices 8 and 9). It also holds a 45% stake in Sareb.
The FROB’s capital injections were generally successful in capitalizing and stabilizing the
banking sector and preventing a destabilizing insolvency in the banking sector. The FROB
now has the power to resolve institutions, in line with Europe’s Single Resolution
Mechanism.
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Spain Context 2012–2013
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

$1.326 trillion in 2012
$1.355 trillion in 2013
$28,324 in 2012
$29,060 in 2013
Data for 2012:
Moody’s: Baa3
S&P: BBB–
Fitch: BBB

Data for 2013:
Moody’s: Baa3
S&P: BBB–
Fitch: BBB
Size of banking system
$2.577 trillion in 2012
$2.518 trillion in 2013
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
194.34% in 2012
185.80% in 2013
Data not available for
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial
2012
system
Data not available for
2013
Five-bank concentration of banking system
70% in 2012
77% in 2013
2% in 2012
Foreign involvement in banking system
0% in 2013
Data not available for
2012
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available for
2013
100% insurance on
deposits up to $133,333 in
2010
Existence of deposit insurance
100% insurance on
deposits up to $137,830 in
2013
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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I.

Overview

Background
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, the Spanish economy was dealing with rapidly growing
private sector debt, weak competitiveness, and other imbalances (IMF 2012b). In early
2009, Spanish banks began to face liquidity shortages and falling real estate values during
the Global Financial Crisis (Official State Bulletin 2009). The resulting credit tightening was
especially difficult for small businesses and households, which were already suffering from
the deterioration of the international crisis in October 2008. Spanish financial institutions
had made it through the early stages of the crisis in late 2007 and early 2008 without
encountering serious problems (BdE 2017a). As the crisis worsened and bank liquidity
problems became more severe, leading to a shortage of credit, Spain established emergency
programs, including a temporary state guarantee scheme of up to €100 billion that
guaranteed bank liabilities and a Financial Asset Acquisition Fund (FAAF) of up to €50
billion to purchase high-quality financial assets to support medium-term bank funding
(Mayer Brown 2009).
In 2009, the Spanish real estate sector was hit and the domestic economy entered a severe
recession (IMF 2012b). Regional savings banks, or cajas, did not have enough capital to
deal with their growing nonperforming loan books (Mayer Brown 2009). In March 2009,
Caja Castilla-La Mancha, which had €24 billion in assets, failed to meet its capital
requirements. The Bank of Spain replaced its directors, and the Deposit Guarantee Fund
provided €7 billion of liquidity before selling the bank to Banco Liberta (at the end of the
merger process, Caja Castilla-La Mancha was integrated in Liberbank, the entity resulting
from the merger of several Cajasur savings banks) and granting an asset protection scheme
(EC 2010). But the central bank argued that the government’s existing tools for supporting
troubled banks were sufficient only for idiosyncratic crises, not the impending systemic
crisis (Ponce Huerta 2019).
Program Description
In June 2009, the Spanish government created the Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada
Bancaria (FROB), in English known as the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring. The FROB
was created in an effort to maintain Spanish economic confidence by supporting financial
institutions (Official State Bulletin 2009). The FROB had two objectives: to restructure
credit institutions that could not independently address their weaknesses and to reinforce
the resources of credit institutions participating in mergers and acquisitions (BdE 2017a).
The FROB typically followed the same three steps in each capital injection: (1) searching
for a private sector solution, (2) using government funds to strengthen the troubled credit
institution, and (3) restructuring the institution with FROB capital (Official State Bulletin
2009, 53194). The FROB acquired preferred convertible shares to facilitate mergers and
acquisitions. The FROB encouraged recapitalized credit institutions to repurchase the
shares as soon as possible. Most participating institutions were unable to do so, and their
preferred shares converted into common capital (BdE 2017a).
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FROB I, in 2010 focused on facilitating mergers and acquisitions from mostly savings
banks. During this period, the FROB acquired €9.7 billion in convertible preferred shares in
savings banks, consolidating 25 institutions into seven. These measures accelerated the
consolidation of the savings bank sector overall from 46 entities in 2007 to 15 entities in
2011 (BdE 2017a). It merged savings banks to clean up their balance sheets and reduce the
oversized sector while achieving efficiency gains by reducing the number of branch offices
and employees (de Juan 2019).
In 2011, Spain sought to strengthen the solvency of its financial institutions, in line with the
Basel III international capital accords. Royal Decree-law 2/2011 established new capital
requirements that conformed to Basel III and established the second set of FROB injections.
FROB II allowed FROB to acquire shares and exercise shareholder rights. During this
period, the FROB acquired common shares of entities to help them meet the new capital
requirements. The FROB subscribed these shares at market value. FROB II required banks
to have core capital equal to 8% of their risk-weighted assets, or 10% if the entity faced
funding constraints (defined as excessive reliance on wholesale funding or limited thirdparty shareholders). The Spanish definition of core capital at the time was close to the
Basel III definition of common equity Tier 1 capital, and it was later aligned with European
regulations (OECD 2012). The Spanish law required banks to meet this requirement by
March 2011, one month after the law was published. Banks could extend the deadline to
September 30 if they submitted a capital plan that the Bank of Spain approved. During that
time, credit institutions could attempt to reach minimum capital requirements by
attracting private investors, going public, or seeking a FROB capital injection. For
institutions that took FROB capital, the Bank of Spain could restrict dividend distribution,
share issuance, and management bonuses if they had a shortfall of an amount equivalent to
20% of their required capital ratio. Banks could find buyers for the shares that the FROB
held, or the banks themselves could repurchase the shares from the FROB within five years
(Official State Bulletin 2011). Further legal decrees gave the FROB and Bank of Spain
supervisory oversight of recapitalized banks, unified the three sectoral deposit guarantee
funds, and established transparency requirements on real estate exposures (Appendix B;
BdE 2017a).
FROB III was launched in 2012 under Law 9/2012 and as a requirement of the
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with the European Commission. Under
FROB III, the FROB had new resolution powers. It also created an early action program that
allowed the FROB to monitor institutions that were struggling but not yet insolvent enough
to require intervention (Official State Bulletin 2012). FROB III allowed the FROB to
recapitalize institutions not only through ordinary shares but also through contingent
convertible securities (CoCos) (FROB III). It also established Sareb, the asset management
company for banking restructuring. More detailed discussion of Sareb can be found in Tam
2021.
Law 11/2015, the Spanish transposition of the European Commission’s bank recovery and
resolution directive (BRRD), built upon FROB III and formalized the resolution processes
while broadening the institutions eligible for assistance. It established competent
supervisors (Bank of Spain, European Central Bank, or National Securities Market
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Commission) that were able help institutions that fail to meet capital requirements through
early action (Official State Bulletin 2015).
Outcomes
The total amount of FROB aid injected in credit institutions was €54.4 billion in a variety of
capital instruments (BdE 2017a). In FROB I, the FROB integrated 25 cajas into seven new
banks and injected €9.7 billion via convertible preferred shares (Appendix C; IMF 2017).
For FROB II, in March 2011, the Bank of Spain identified 13 institutions that did not meet
their capital requirements and required them to present their recapitalization strategies
(BdE 2017a). Four of those banks were able to raise funds through share sales or injections
by their parent companies. The FROB agreed to provide €15.9 billion to recapitalize nine
banks, but several of these banks were again able to raise private funds. Ultimately, the
FROB subscribed €5.7 billion of common shares to recapitalize four banking groups—
Novacaixagalicia, Catalunya Caixa, Unnim, and Banco de Valencia. A fifth, Caja de Ahorros
del Mediterráneo (CAM), requested FROB II support but received aid instead from the
Deposit Guarantee Fund (Appendix E). The FROB’s equity stakes in the four banks ranged
from 90% to 100% (FROB 2019). The four banks included three of the seven banking
groups merged via FROB I (Ponce Huerta 2019). The Deposit Guarantee Fund compensated
the FROB €953 million for its investment and losses in Unnim: €380 million for preferred
share subscriptions in FROB I, €5 million for capitalization of accrued interest, and €568
for capital increase in FROB II.
For FROB III, the Kingdom of Spain borrowed3 €41.3 billion under the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), which was then channeled to FROB through a loan from the Spanish
Treasury (Strauch; IMF 2017). A Memorandum of Understanding between the European
Commission and Spain made this aid contingent on a stress test of the Spanish banking
system conducted by independent consultants (EC 2012). Oliver Wyman conducted
independent assessments of Spanish banks to determine their capital shortfalls and the
level of the FROB’s participation (Fontevecchia 2012). The stress test identified 10
institutions that needed a total of €55.9 billion in capital. The FROB ultimately injected
€38.8 billion to recapitalize eight credit institutions for restructuring or resolution; two
banks were able to raise capital privately. The FROB helped make some failing institutions
more attractive for potential buyers through asset protection schemes and protections
against contingent liabilities. It also invested €2.1 billion in Sareb (Spain’s “bad bank”) in
2012, which amounted to 45% of Sareb’s equity and subordinated debt.
The FROB’s losses as of 2018 were €42.6 billion not including the interest and fees
received or paid, or the expenses incurred. As FROB wrote off early investments in banks
and experienced losses, the government agreed to convert the loan that it issued to FROB
(using the loan the ESM gave to Spain) into equity, to make FROB’s equity positive. In 2012,
According to a commenter, the amount of this loan was up to €100 billion, of which only €41 billion was
used.
3
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the government converted €27 billion of its original €41.3 billion in state loans to FROB
into equity (Strauch; IMF 2017). In June 2017, the government converted an additional
€3 billion of state loans to FROB into equity. The FROB owed the government €10.5 billion
at the end of 2018 (FROB 2019).
About €38 billion of the FROB’s losses resulted from four banks: Abanca (formerly NCG),
Bankia, Catalunya Caixa, and Banco de Valencia. NCG and Catalunya Caixa participated in
FROB I, II, and III; Bankia participated in FROB I and III; and Banco de Valencia participated
in FROB II and III (IMF 2017). The FROB still owns approximately 16.12% of CaixaBank,
which has absorbed Bankia.
As seen in Figure 1, by the end of 2016, FROB still held about €11 billion in investments
(IMF 2017), mostly representing its remaining 66% stake in Bankia.
Figure 1: Legacy Assets and State Contingencies, end-2016 (in billions of euros,
unless indicated otherwise)

Source: IMF 2017.

Between 2008 and 2011, the savings bank sector in Spain changed radically; 42 of the 45
institutions existing at the end of 2007 eventually received capital injections from the Bank
of Spain in 2010 and 2011 and were merged to 15 entities (BdE 2017a). The FROB gave
financial support for seven of these mergers during FROB I. In some of these cases, the
three sectoral deposit guarantee funds also contributed financial support. Figures 2 and 3
show an overview of some of FROB’s injections and interventions in major banks.
The Kingdom of Spain accepted €38.8 billion in European assistance for recapitalization in
2012; the outstanding amount was €23.7 billion, or 57%, as of early 2019 (EC 2019).
The FROB had recovered €5.9 billion of aid it disbursed as of 2019, of which €4.5 billion
came from bank sales and capital instrument repayments and €1.4 billion came from
interest repayments (Ponce Huerta 2019). This does not include €2.8 billion received from
Bankia in dividends or the proceeds from selling shares of Bankia for €2.1 billion.
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Figure 2: Historical Table of FROB Aid as of 2017

Source: Ponce Huerta 2019.
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Figure 3: Summary of Integration and Restructuring Processes in FROB I

Source: Ponce Huerta 2019.
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II.

Key Design Decisions

1. Part of a Package: The capital injections power of the Fund for the Orderly
Restructuring of the Banking Sector was not initially part of a package, but it was
updated to include resolution powers, including the transfer of assets to an asset
management company (Sareb) as well as a resolution fund (National Resolution
Fund).
The financial safety net infrastructure that existed in Spain in 2009 included FROB as well
as three sector-focused deposit guarantee funds and the Bank of Spain (IMF 2012b; Official
State Bulletin 2009). Though these organizations worked in tandem, they were not a
package, as the government created the deposit guarantee funds in 1977 under the
administration of the Bank of Spain (Official State Bulletin 1977). In November 2011, the
government merged the three deposit guarantee funds into the Fondo de Garantía de
Depósitos (FGD) or Deposit Guarantee Fund in English (BdE 2017a). Law 9/2012 expanded
the FROB’s powers and established Sareb, Spain’s government-owned asset management
company (Official State Bulletin 2012). Sareb was responsible for managing assets
transferred to it by Spanish institutions recapitalized by the FROB. Law 9/2012 also
established the FROB as a resolution authority.
2. Legal Authority: Initially, Royal Decree-law 9/2009 (Official State Bulletin 2009)
gave FROB the power to carry out temporary capital injections, though later laws
added to its authority.
The FROB was created in June 2009 by Royal Decree-law 9/2009 to manage the
restructuring of credit institutions and contribute to the strengthening of their resources
(Official State Bulletin 2009). Royal Decree-law 2/2011 allowed FROB to help entities
achieve capital targets of 8% or 10% of risk-weighted assets (Official State Bulletin 2011).
Law 9/2012 established the possibility of the resolution, not just the restructuring, of a
credit institution that was not viable and established FROB’s role in such processes, as well
as early action to prevent the failure of a financial institution.4 FROB could value
4 Definitions

of actions from Law 9/2012, Article 2:
Early action: The procedure applicable to a credit institution when, in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter II, it fails or there are objective elements that are reasonably foreseeable that cannot meet the
solvency, liquidity, or organizational structure or internal control requirements, but is in a position to return
to compliance by its own means, without prejudice to the exceptional and limited public financial support
provided for in article 9.f of this Law.
Restructuring: The procedure applicable to a credit institution when, in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter III, it requires public financial support to ensure its viability and it is foreseeable that such support
will be reimbursed or recovered in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V, or when its resolution could
not be carried out without seriously damaging effects on the stability of the financial system.
Resolution: The procedure applicable to a credit institution when, in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter IV, it is unviable, or foreseeable that it will be in the near future, and for reasons of public interest
and financial stability it is necessary to avoid bankruptcy.
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institutions and restructure institutions that required public financial support to maintain
viability while minimizing the use of public resources (Official State Bulletin 2012).
According to a commenter close to the program, this law also included the possibility to
impose losses to subordinated creditors in these processes.
After FROB III, Law 11/2015 established a more formal and comprehensive regime of
systemic risk policy. It clarified the FROB’s resolution powers and transposed the BRRD
into Spanish regulation, including bail-in power for both subordinated and senior debt.
This allowed a troubled entity to remain in business while separating its unviable parts, the
latter of which was already possible under Law 9/2012. It also gave the FROB early action
and preventative powers to reduce the risk of insolvency and to facilitate the resolution of
the entity or specific assets if needed. The 2015 law also provided tools that the FROB used
to shift the financial burden of resolution to an entity’s shareholders and creditors rather
than public resources (a “bail in”). The law allowed the preventative resolution authority
(the Bank of Spain) to create resolution plans for less significant entities like those not
under European Central Bank supervision, which it required to include a scenario in which
no public support was available. This law also empowered the FROB to perform capital
increase or reduction operations, amortize capital instruments, or perform internal
recapitalization actions (Official State Bulletin 2015).
3. Communications: The first law creating the FROB was advertised as an effort to
prevent systemic risk from failing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in
an otherwise strong banking sector, but communications about the later law
showed more urgency in dealing with the financial crisis.
Royal Decree-law 9/2009 paints the Spanish banking sector in 2009 as resilient and
relatively strong (Official State Bulletin 2009). However, it states that smaller struggling
institutions could, en masse, constitute a systemic risk.
The Congress of Deputies (lower house of the legislature) in Spain approved Royal Decreelaw 2/2011, allowing the recapitalization of Spanish entities by a vote of 177 to eight, with
157 abstentions from the Popular Party and Basque nationalist party (Europa Press 2011).
Elena Salgado, the Spanish deputy prime minister and former minister of economy and
finance, described the law as being extremely urgent and necessary to give the green light
to the most recent package of financial reforms articulated in this decree and to minimize
the impact of the global financial crisis on the Spanish financial system. She said it would
help to complete the reorganization of the financial sector, clear doubts in the markets, and
guarantee a sufficient flow of credit to encourage maximum recovery and job creation.
4. Governance/Administration: The Ministry of Economy and Finance decided on
the composition of FROB’s Governing Commission, composed of representatives
from the Bank of Spain and the three deposit guarantee funds.
An eight-member Governing Commission appointed by the Ministry of Economy and
Finance operated the FROB beginning in 2009 (Official State Bulletin 2009). The Bank of
Spain proposed five of the eight members. The three deposit guarantee funds—for savings
banks, banks, and credit cooperatives—were represented by one member each. The
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minister of economy and finance also appointed a member from the General Intervention
Board of the State Administration, proposed by the general auditor, as an additional
representative on the Governing Commission with a voice but not a vote. The chair of FROB
was the deputy governor of the Bank of Spain at the time.
The Governing Commission was empowered to make its own rules and delegate power as
it saw fit (Official State Bulletin 2009). It had the power to approve external financing
operations, like bond issuance, to finance FROB’s activities. At least half the voting
members of the Governing Commission had to be present to hold a session and adopt
agreements, which had to be supported by a majority of members. The secretary of state
for the economy appeared quarterly before the Congress of Deputies Finance and Economy
Committee to report the activities of FROB and the situation of the Spanish banking sector.
The Governing Commission subsequently had to approve this report. The president of the
Governing Commission also reported to this congressional committee within 30 days after
each injection by the fund. The Governing Commission was also obligated to keep the
activities of the fund secret.
In 2011, the legislature changed the composition of the Governing Commission to have
nine members, of which one each represented the Ministry of Finance and Budgets and the
Ministry of Economy (Official State Bulletin 2011). Four members were proposed by the
Bank of Spain, and three members were proposed by the deposit guarantee funds.
In 2012, the legislature changed the composition of the Governing Commission to include
four members nominated by the Bank of Spain, of which one was the president of the
Governing Commission; the secretary general of the Treasury, who was also the vice
president; the undersecretary of economy and competitiveness; the president of the
Accounting and Audit Institute; the director general of economic policy; and the general
director of budget. A director general of the FROB was appointed by royal decree of the
Council of Ministers, and he supervised and managed the FROB (Official State Bulletin
2012). According to a commenter close to the program, as the deposit guarantee funds had
stepped out of FROB’s equity, they no longer had representatives on the Governing
Commission as of this law.
In 2015, the legislature again changed the composition of the Governing Commission to
have 11 members: the president of the FROB (chair); four members nominated by the Bank
of Spain, one of whom was the deputy governor (vice-chair); three members nominated by
the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness; the vice president of the National Securities
Market Commission (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, or CNMV); and two
representatives from the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (Official State
Bulletin 2015). This law indicated that the chair of FROB was independent form the Bank of
Spain; he or she was proposed by the government and confirmed by the legislature.
Figure 4 below shows the summary of member changes for the Governing Commission of
FROB.
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Figure 4: Development of the Governing Committee of the FROB (2009–Present)

Source: Ponce Huerta 2019.
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5. Funding Sources: The FROB had initial funding of €9 billion from the General
State Budget and deposit guarantee funds, which it supplemented through
borrowing.
Of the FROB’s initial €9 billion, €3 billion was to be disbursed when its constitution was
formalized, defined by the time the members of the Governing Commission were all
appointed (Official State Bulletin 2009). The General State Budget allocated €6.75 billion to
the initial financing of the FROB. The deposit guarantee funds contributed €2.25 billion,
and FROB had authority to obtain additional financing by issuing fixed-income securities,
taking loans, or participating in any other debt operations, provided that those borrowings
did not exceed three times the permanent financing at any time. After January 1, 2010, with
the authorization of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the FROB could obtain
additional funding of up to 10 times its permanent financing.
The law required the FROB to hold uncommitted funds in public debt or other highly liquid,
low-risk assets (Official State Bulletin 2009). Any returns from these assets were added to
the FROB’s permanent financing, which paid any fees incurred in the management of these
assets.
The law empowered the General State Administration to guarantee the FROB’s debt,
subject to the approval of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Official State Bulletin
2009). Until December 31, 2009, the guarantee was limited to €27 billion; the legislature
set the limit in subsequent years in the annual budget. If the FROB defaulted on an
obligation, the state paid compensation to the owners of guaranteed securities within five
days of the expiration of the obligation. The Ministry of Economy and Finance established
the terms of guaranteed compensations, and the General Directorate of the Treasury and
Financial Policy would make payments if the guarantee were exercised, though it never
was.
In 2012, the Spanish government requested financial assistance from the European Union
(EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). This aid was approved subject to stress tests
conducted by external consultants in order to identify the capital needs of various
institutions (EC 2012). The stress tests carried out by consultant Oliver Wyman concluded
that 10 banks required €55.9 billion of additional capital (BdE 2017a). Two banks found
private solutions. The European Stability Mechanism ultimately provided €39 billion to
recapitalize the other eight banks; the FROB covered the remaining needs by enforcing
losses on shareholders and subordinated debt holders and facilitating asset transfers to
Sareb (IMF 2017).
In 2017, the Ministry of Economy capitalized €3 billion more of its loans to the FROB to
strengthen its balance sheet. This capitalization was done to return FROB’s equity to
positive numbers, but no new money was involved, just an effect of accounting. To keep
FROB afloat, the Treasury converted some of its debt holdings in FROB to equity, allowing
FROB to maintain positive equity and potentially attract creditors, though FROB has not
funded itself through debt issuance since 2011 (Segovia 2017).
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6. Eligible Institutions: Institutions eligible for FROB were savings banks (FROB I),
commercial banks (FROB II), and various credit institutions (FROB III).
The government created FROB I primarily to recapitalize and merge savings banks and
FROB II primarily to recapitalize commercial banks. Most of the savings banks that
received FROB I injections were transformed into banks due to changes in regulation. All
recipients of FROB II funds were previously savings banks prior to FROB I.
After the stress tests, Law 11/2015 permitted the FROB to be a resolution authority for a
broader set of companies, including investment services companies and financial entities
(other than insurance and reinsurance entities) established in Spain that were subsidiaries
of credit institutions or investment services companies (Official State Bulletin 2015). It also
included financial holding companies based in Spain or other European Union member
states, provided they were supervised by a competent supervisor.5 Spanish branches of
European Union entities were also eligible. Investment services companies whose legally
required minimum share capital was less than €730,000 or that conducted specific
activities enumerated in the law were not eligible.
7. Restructuring Procedures: In all three phases, restructuring authorities
including the FROB could overtake the management of a failing credit institution
and facilitate a merger or acquisition with a solvent entity.
FROB I and II
The Bank of Spain expected struggling credit institutions to inform the central bank within
one month and provide an action plan for strengthening their equity (Official State Bulletin
2009). The plan could involve a merger or acquisition with a solvent entity, which had to be
actualized within three months. The Bank of Spain evaluated the organization and
management of the credit institution to determine whether it was viable as a stand-alone
entity going forward.
If the Bank of Spain determined that a credit institution that had not submitted a plan had
financial weaknesses, it required such an institution to submit a plan within one month.
The Bank of Spain needed to approve these plans and could modify or add necessary
measures to ensure that the plan was sufficient to overcome any financial weaknesses. If a
month passed after the submission of a plan without explicit approval, the plan was
approved automatically.
The FROB intervened to restructure any credit institution that did not present a required
plan, presented an infeasible plan, rejected Bank of Spain additions to a proposed plan,
declared to the Bank of Spain that there was no viable solution, deviated greatly from the
A competent supervisor was the Bank of Spain, European Central Bank, within the Single Supervisory
Mechanism, responsible for the supervision of credit institutions, and the National Securities Market
Commission as the authority responsible for the supervision of investment services companies (Official State
Bulletin 2015).
5
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plan, or had a plan that its Deposit Guarantee Fund objected to. In these cases, the Bank of
Spain replaced the management of the credit institution and appointed the FROB as the
administrator of the institution. The FROB had one month to create a detailed report on the
institution’s viability and to submit a restructuring plan to the Bank of Spain. The FROB
also submitted an economic impact report of the restructuring to the Ministry of Economy
and Finance. The ministry could oppose the restructuring within 10 days of submission. As
long as a restructuring plan was prepared, the FROB could provide financial support to the
credit institution on a temporary basis by way of measures such as favorable loans or asset
acquisition, or facilitations of mergers and acquisitions. Investments made by the FROB
were not subject to legal limitations applied to the deposit guarantee fund in credit
institutions (Official State Bulletin 2009). In addition, the boards of entities requesting aid
under FROB II had between five and 15 members, of which at least one-third were
independent directors (Official State Bulletin 2011).
For FROB II, in March 2011, the Bank of Spain identified 13 institutions that did not meet
their capital requirements and required them to present their recapitalization strategies
(BdE 2017a). Four of those banks were able to raise funds through share sales or injections
by their parent companies. The FROB agreed to provide €15.9 billion to recapitalize nine
banks (Appendix E), but several of these banks were again able to raise private funds.
Ultimately, the FROB purchased €5.7 billion of common shares to recapitalize four banking
groups—Novacaixagalicia, Catalunya Caixa, Unnim, and Banco de Valencia. A fifth, Caja de
Ahorros del Mediterráneo, requested FROB II support but received aid instead from the
Deposit Guarantee Fund (Appendix F). The FROB’s equity stakes in the four banks ranged
from 90% to 100% (FROB 2019). The four banks included three of the seven banking
groups merged via FROB I (Ponce Huerta 2019). The Deposit Guarantee Fund compensated
the FROB €953 million for its investment and losses in Unnim: €380 million for preferred
share subscriptions in FROB I, €5 million for capitalization of accrued interest, and €568
for capital increase in FROB II.
FROB III
The law provided three possible actions for credit institutions: early intervention,
restructuring, and resolution.
Institutions that did not, but could potentially, maintain viability and meet capital
requirements through their own means were eligible for early action (Official State Bulletin
2012). This entailed submitting an action plan to the Bank of Spain, which, with FROB’s
input, modified and approved it, as appropriate. This process helped capitalize entities
without public support, to prevent them from becoming insolvent.
Institutions that required public support to maintain their viability, and whose resolution
would likely cause detrimental effects to Spanish financial stability, were considered for
restructuring. These institutions had to inform the FROB and the Bank of Spain of their
status and, within 15 days, submit a plan of restructuring, with a planned execution date of
no more than three months after its approval by the FROB (Official State Bulletin 2012).
The FROB could modify the plan before it was sent to the Bank of Spain for approval, which
had to approve it within one month of receiving it.
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The Memorandum of Understanding between Spain and the European Commission signed
in 2012 established a framework that categorized banks into different levels of eligibility
for aid (EC 2012). Based on the results of a stress test conducted by an external consultant
and the restructuring plans of banks, banks were grouped into four categories.
Group 0 will constitute those banks for which no capital shortfall is identified and no
further action is required. Group 1 has been pre-defined as banks already owned by
the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) (BFA/Bankia, Catalunya Caixa, NCG
Banco and Banco de Valencia). Group 2 will constitute banks with capital shortfalls
identified by the Stress Test and unable to meet those capital shortfalls privately
without having recourse to State aid. Finally, Group 3 will constitute banks with capital
shortfall identified by the stress test with credible recapitalisation plans and able to
meet those capital shortfalls privately without recourse to State aid (EC 2012).6
The Bank of Spain and the European Central Bank closely monitored the liquidity situation
of banks that had capital shortfalls in the stress test (EC 2012). The Bank of Spain regularly
reported this information to the European Commission, European Central Bank, and
International Monetary Fund.
The stress test assessed 14 banking groups, which represented 90% of the assets of the
Spanish banking system over a three-year period (BdE 2017a).
The stress test identified 10 banks that needed €55.9 billion of additional capital (BdE
2017a). Two banks found private solutions. The FROB invested €39 billion to recapitalize
the other eight banks, using funds provided by the European Stability Mechanism. The
banks raised their capital ratios through loss absorption by investors holding subordinated
debt and other hybrid instruments, asset transfers to Sareb, burden sharing, and asset sales
(IMF 2012a).
The stress test concluded that 90% of capital needs were in the four entities in Group 1, in
which FROB already held a majority equity stake, and that the core of the Spanish banking
system was relatively healthy (BdE 2017a).
8. FROB issued three major rounds of support, first through convertible preferred
shares (FROB I), then ordinary shares (FROB II), and finally both ordinary shares
and contingent convertible securities (FROB III).
FROB I
The FROB was allowed to make capital injections to certain institutions that did not satisfy
set conditions (See “Key Design Decision No. 6”) but still needed capital with which to
integrate themselves with each other. As a condition of the capital injection, these
participating institutions had to improve their efficiency, administration, and management,

6

See Oliver Wyman 2012.

615

Spain – Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB) Capital Injections

as well as resize their productive capacity, preparing a merger or acquisition plan detailing
these processes that were approved by the Bank of Spain. These FROB capital injections
were performed through acquisitions of preferred convertible shares in participatory
quotas or portions of share capital (Official State Bulletin 2009).
The first round was in March 2010, when the FROB issued €9.7 billion of convertible
preference shares in the integration processes of Unnim, Catalunya Caixa, CEISS,
Novacaixagalicia, Banco Financiero y de Ahorros, Banco Mare Nostrum, Banca Base, and
Banca Cívica, and the restructuring of Cajasur. The restructuring of Cajasur consisted of
purchasing €800 million of equity units and providing a €1.5 billion line of credit. This set
of interventions was not sufficient to address the problems in the saving bank sector, likely
due to an incomplete write-off of capital, the limited efficacy of convertible preference
shares, and a general downturn in the economy (Ponce Huerta 2019). In 2010 and 2011,
the restructuring of the banking sector, and especially the savings bank sector, resulted in
the merging of 42 of 45 banks into 15 institutions, although three of the mergers occurred
without FROB or Deposit Guarantee Fund aid (Caixa-Girona, Unicaja-Jaén, and Caja 3) (BdE
2017a).
FROB II
Royal Decree-law 2/2011 authorized FROB II, raised capital requirements, and allowed
FROB to recapitalize banks using ordinary shares. This law allowed FROB to subscribe
ordinary shares under distressed market conditions to help entities that could not capture
capital through traditional markets (Official State Bulletin 2011). FROB II injected €5.7
billion in 2011 and 2012 to Catalunya Caixa, Novacaixagalicia, Unnim, and Banco de
Valencia (Appendix E; IMF 2017; Ponce Huerta 2019).
FROB II required entities to hold core capital equal to 8% risk-weighted assets (Official
State Bulletin 2011). The standard was 10% for those entities that had more than 20% of
their capital from wholesale financing and had less 20% of their capital in the possession of
third parties. This allowed the FROB to participate directly in recapitalized institutions’
boards of directors in proportion to its percentage of capital (BdE 2017a). Entities
recapitalized under FROB II that were noncompliant by more than 20% of the core capital
requirement had to present recapitalization and business plans that committed to reducing
structural costs, improving corporate governance and limiting bonuses, and modifying
credit activity.
The FROB’s acquisition of ordinary shares was conditional on the beneficiary’s preparation
of a recapitalization plan that included a business plan and commitments to reduce
structural costs, improve corporate governance, and have better credit activity. The FROB
reported to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, detailing the financial impact of its
acquisition of common stock. The FROB could become part of the boards of directors of
recapitalized entities in proportion to its share percentage. It could also still convert
convertible preferred shares, as allowed in Royal Decree-law 9/2009. FROB contributions
were made through cash injections or the delivery of securities representing public debt
(i.e., treasuries) or securities issued by FROB itself (Official State Bulletin 2011).
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Conditions for recapitalization under FROB II included submitting a business plan and
committing to reduce structural costs, improving corporate governance, and increasing
financing to small and medium-sized companies. If a FROB II applicant had issued
convertible preferred shares to FROB I, it could request an immediate conversion of those
shares into ordinary shares or contributions to the share capital. Preferred shares
subscribed before Royal Decree-law 2/2011 were to be governed by the law in effect when
they were purchased. Independent directors were not allowed to remain in their positions
for more than 12 continuous years. The board had to create an internal commission or two
separate committees of appointments and remuneration. The former assessed the
competencies and experiences of the board and its members and evaluated candidates to
fill vacancies, while the latter ensured compliance with the remuneration policy
established by the company for directors, executives, and other managers. When a
company acquired an entity with the help of FROB or deposit guarantee funds, it did not
need to make a public tender offer, as was normally required according to Spanish law
(Official State Bulletin 2011).
FROB III
FROB III occurred after the passage of Law 9/2012, which established FROB’s powers as a
resolution authority and allowed it to perform capital injections not only through ordinary
shares but also through contingent convertible securities. About €41.3 billion was injected,
of which €39 billion was used to recapitalize eight credit institutions for restructuring or
resolution and €2.2 billion was used to purchase FROB’s stake and subordinated debt in
Sareb, the asset management company for bank restructuring. FROB III was financed
through European Stability Mechanism funding (IMF 2017). Sareb acquired troubled real
estate assets, which reduced financial sector recapitalization requirements by €1.3 billion
and restored confidence in financial institutions (Ponce Huerta 2019). Shareholders and
subordinated creditors incurred losses of about €14 billion, 70% of whom were retail
investors who had acquired preference shares in somewhat opaque transactions.7
The Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and Spain signed
in 2012 formed a strategy to strengthen the Spanish banking sector. The MoU specified that
a stress test conducted by independent consultants would determine capital shortfalls of
individual banks and the system overall. This stress test categorized banks accordingly:
Group 0 banks had no capital shortfall and required no intervention, Group 1 banks were
already owned by the FROB (these were BFA/Bankia, Catalunya Caixa, NCG Banco, and
Banco de Valencia), Group 2 banks had capital shortfalls that required public support, and
Group 3 banks had capital shortfalls that could be met privately (EC 2012).
Spanish authorities prepared restructuring plans for Group 1 banks in conjunction with the
European Commission. These included BFA/Bankia, NCG Bank, Catalunya Bank, and Banco
According to a commenter close to the program, most of the retail investors eventually recouped their
investments through a specifically created deposit guarantee fund liquidity facility, arbitration procedures,
and court rulings related to the sale of hybrid instruments.
7
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de Valencia, which were recapitalized on December 26, 2012, for a total of €36.9 billion.
They also presented plans for Group 2 by October 2012 to the European Commission. Both
involved moving impaired assets to an external asset management company (Sareb). Group
2 banks included Banco Mare Nostrum, Caja 3, España-Duero, and Liberbank, and they
were injected with €1.865 billion on March 12, 2013. Caja 3 (which received €407 million),
España-Duero (which received €604 million), and Liberbank (which received €124
million) were recapitalized using contingent convertible securities, while Banco Mare
Nostrum was recapitalized with €730 million worth of shares. Banco CEISS was also a
Group 2 bank but was resolved after an injection of €407 million of CoCos. Group 3 banks
that were planning a significant equity raise (of more than 2% risk-weighted assets) could
issue contingent convertible securities to FROB to meet their capital needs by December
2012, though this was not used; Group 3 banks performed either private capital increases
or asset reductions. They were redeemable until June 2013, if the bank succeeded in
finding the necessary capital from private sources; if not, the FROB would convert them
into equity and recapitalize the struggling bank. Group 3 banks planning a smaller equity
raise were able to do so until June 2013. If they failed, they were recapitalized. Group 3
banks that benefited from FROB support were required to transfer bad assets to Sareb (EC
2012). Banco Popular and Ibercaja were Group 3 banks (BdE 2017a). According to a
commenter close to the program, the choice between ordinary shares and CoCos depended
on the viability of the entity after a capital injection. Banco CEISS was under resolution and
would normally have received an injection of ordinary shares; however, as it had already
agreed to integrate in Unicaja, the FROB subscribed CoCos instead of shares.
Restructuring was done through financial support, the transfer of assets or liabilities to an
asset management company (Sareb), or a combination of both strategies. Convertible share
instruments were issued with conditions that included repurchase of the shares within five
years and the exercise of conversion upon FROB’s discretion of the entity’s solvency. This
acquisition was priced relative to the economic value of the entity minus a discount in
accordance with EU State Aid regulation. FROB purchased them with bonds issued by the
European Stability Mechanism. The FROB’s voting rights and board participation were
determined by the proportion of shares it acquired in an entity. The FROB also imposed
losses on private shareholders of hybrid capital and subordinated debt to support the
recapitalization plans of credit institutions, including offers to exchange it for capital
instruments, offers to repurchase issued securities, reduction of the nominal value of debt,
and early amortization of debt at a value other than the nominal value. FROB III also
created and asset management company to which to transfer bad assets (Sareb) (Official
State Bulletin 2012).8
The FROB could sell shares, as well as assets and liabilities, to third parties through a
transparent, speedy, and impartial process that avoided conflicts of interest while
maximizing sale price and minimizing the use of public resources (Official State Bulletin

8

See Tam 2021.
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2012). However, commenters from the program said that while FROB could have sold its
CoCos, it held them until the issuers repurchased them.
After FROB III
Law 11/2015 added to FROB’s recapitalization arsenal the ability to orchestrate internal
recapitalization of an insolvent entity (Official State Bulletin 2015). In response to the
European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) of 2014, the law also created the Single
Resolution Board and National Resolution Fund, which helped synchronize Spanish
resolution policies with those of Europe as a whole. This allowed FROB to require that
losses be borne internally through the write-down or conversion of capital instruments, or
via bail-in by other eligible liability (BdE 2015). To make sure the first was sufficient to
absorb losses, resolution authorities set a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible
liabilities for each institution.
9. There were no explicit individual participation limits.
Research did not reveal any limits on individual participation.
10. The acquisition of shares or quotas by the FROB required the cancellation of
preemptive subscription rights of existing shareholders or quota participants.
When the FROB acquired participatory quotas of a bank, it had the right to representation
at shareholders’ meetings equivalent to the percentage of equity they owned (Official State
Bulletin 2009). This right was maintained throughout the FROB’s possession of these
securities and was not transferred to any subsequent acquirers. Similarly, the FROB’s
voting rights in the assembly of a credit union to which it had contributed were
proportional to its contributions with respect to the total capital stock of the credit union.
The cancellation of voting rights for existing shareholders happened at the time of the
adoption of the capital increase or quota issuance agreement (Official State Bulletin 2009).
The status of different parties and how they bore losses was established in Law 9/2012,
Chapter I, Article 4. They were as follows:
(a) The shareholders or partners of the entities were the first to bear losses.
(b) The providers of subordinated debt bore losses arising from restructuring or
resolution after shareholders, according to the order of priority established in
bankruptcy legislation, though the exceptions established in this law took
precedence.
(c) Creditors of the same rank were treated the same unless this act indicated an
exception.
(d) A creditor did not bear a loss greater than the loss s/he would have borne if the
entity were liquidated in a bankruptcy proceeding.
(e) If an entity was resolved, its administrators were replaced.
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(f) The administrators of the credit institutions were liable for damages caused, in
proportion to their participation and the severity of the damages.
FROB was not included as a shareholder in allocations of losses or protections for
shareholders or partners.
If a credit institution was resolved, FROB was permitted to transfer shares or capital
instruments to a third party without obtaining the consent of the shareholders (Official
State Bulletin 2012). The sale price deducted the administrative and other expenses
incurred by FROB including the costs of financial support instruments that were previously
reimbursed to FROB.
Law 11/2015 later modified this loss structure as follows (Article 4).
(a) The shareholders or partners, as appropriate, of the entities were the first to bear
losses.
(b) The creditors of the entities bore, where appropriate, losses arising from the
resolution after the shareholders or partners and in accordance with the order of
priority established in the bankruptcy legislation, with the exceptions established in
this law.
(c) Creditors of the same rank were treated in an equivalent manner unless otherwise
provided in this act.
(d) No shareholder or creditor bore losses greater than what they would have borne if
the entity were liquidated in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.
(e) The directors and general or similar directors of the entity were replaced, unless, on
an exceptional basis, its maintenance was considered strictly necessary to achieve
the objectives of the resolution.
(f) The directors and general or similar directors of the entity had to provide all
necessary assistance to achieve the objectives of the resolution.
(g) In accordance with the provisions of bankruptcy, commercial, and criminal
legislation, the administrators of the entities and any other natural or legal person
were liable for the damages caused in proportion to their participation and the
seriousness of those.
(h) Guaranteed deposits were fully protected.
(i) The resolution measures adopted were accompanied by the corresponding
guarantees and safeguards provided for in this law and its development regulations.
Since Law 11/2015 also formalized the write-down of capital and bail-in mechanisms, it
delineates the treatment of shareholders in the case of internal recapitalization. The FROB
could amortize existing or transfer to creditors capital instruments and eligible liabilities of
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the entity at a reduced nominal value. The sequence to which capital or liabilities were
amortized was as follows (Official State Bulletin 2015):
(a) The elements of Level 1 ordinary capital proportional to the losses and as far as
possible,
(b) The principal amount of the Level 1 additional capital instruments to the extent
necessary and to the extent possible,
(c) The principal amount of Level 2 capital instruments to the extent necessary and to
the extent possible,
(d) The principal amount of the subordinated debt that was not additional capital of
Level 1 or 2, then
(e) The principal amount or the outstanding amount of the admissible liabilities, in
accordance with the priority of the credit rights provided in the applicable
bankruptcy regulations.
Capital or eligible liabilities of the same rank had losses equitably distributed amongst
them. The FROB was also was able to reorganize the activity of the entity. Only after these
methods had been exercised could the National Resolution Fund contribute to the entity to
cover any loss that remains or acquire shares or other capital instruments in order to
recapitalize it (Official State Bulletin 2015).
Institutions that were recapitalized had to go through a hybrid instrument loss-sharing
exercise for shareholders and preferred shareholders. Most of these arrangements were
compulsory and generally required a recapitalized institution to repurchase preferred
shares and subordinated debt at a haircut of 26%, on average. Shareholders received
shares or mandatorily convertible bonds, while subordinated debt holders received senior
debt instruments with a haircut. To limit the burden on retail investors and give them
liquidity, the Deposit Guarantee Fund was empowered to acquire the shares those
investors received and did so to the tune of €1.8 billion. A committee was created to
determine the compensation that banks owned by FROB could dispense in response to
disputes from customers suing for damages (BdE 2017a).
11. Exit Strategy: FROB exited from some of its capital injections through repurchase
of shares and sale of shares to a third party.
Under FROB I, in the cases where the Bank of Spain allowed the FROB to replace the
management of the credit institution, FROB was responsible for declaring bankruptcy
(Official State Bulletin 2009).
The FROB divested from these participations by either repurchase of shares by the issuing
entity or transference of shares to third parties. This divestiture was designed in a way to
minimize competition and had be completed within five years of the date of compliance of
the integration plan). The recapitalized entity had to issue quarterly reports on the merger
or acquisition to the Bank of Spain; if it was unable fulfill said plan, the FROB modified its
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terms and extended its repurchase terms by up to two years. Credit institutions that
fulfilled the requirements of eligible institutions above but failed to perform their merger
plans were still eligible for FROB aid (Official State Bulletin 2009).
For ordinary shares associated with FROB II, divestment occurred within a maximum term
of five years. The FROB was allowed to resell securities to the issuing entity or third parties
proposed by the beneficiary entity within one year of the acquisition. The maximum term
was two years, in which case it could require the beneficiary to adhere to additional terms.
The conditions of resale had to ensure efficient use of public funds and be carried out under
market conditions, while complying with Spanish and EU regulations, especially that
concerning State Aid. However, the divestment of contributions to capital stock was not
subject to any legal or statutory limitations (Official State Bulletin 2011).
These participating institutions had to commit to repurchasing the preferred shares held
by the FROB as soon as they were able. If five years passed without a repurchase, the FROB
could request conversion into common shares, participatory fees, or dividends within six
months after the five-year mark. The FROB could also convert shares earlier if repurchase
seemed unlikely, and the credit institution had to follow all other conditions in the merger
or acquisition plan.
As of 2021, FROB still owns 16.12% of CaixaBank shares (previously approximately 61% of
Bankia shares) (Ponce Huerta 2019).
12. In 2012, FROB gained authority to resolve unviable institutions and create an
early action program to improve their health before they required government
intervention.
In 2012, the FROB gained authority to resolve unviable institutions and create an early
action program to improve their health prior to their requiring government intervention.
This occurred under Law 9/2012 in response to the MOU signed with the European
Commission to receive European Stability Mechanism funds. It gave the FROB powers to
value institutions, as well as restructure those that required public financial support to
maintain viability, but it was mandated to minimize the amount of public resources used to
maintain financial stability (Official State Bulletin 2012). It also established an asset
management company for bank restructuring, Sareb (see Tam 2021).
Under the law, the FROB used four tools individually or jointly to facilitate resolution of a
credit entity: the sale of the entity’s business, the transfer of assets and liabilities to a
bridge bank, the transfer of assets and liabilities to an asset management company, or
financial support to the purchasers to the business (including the bridge bank9 or asset
management company mentioned in the previous tools) (Official State Bulletin 2012).

A bridge bank for the purposes of this case study was a credit institution, including the entity itself in
resolution in which the FROB participated (Official State Bulletin 2012). The bridge bank had to comply with
regulations and supervision applicable to credit institutions. The total value of liabilities transmitted to the
9

622

Sankar

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

The 2015 law transposing the European Commission’s bank recovery and resolution
directive to Spain built upon the 2012 law formalizing the processes of resolution. The
FROB was now able to work toward an entity’s survival while resolving the unviable parts
of it. In accordance with the European Single Resolution Mechanism, the 2015 law also
established the National Resolution Fund, which was responsible for financing the
resolution processes of financial entities. The National Resolution Fund was administered
by the FROB and was required to constitute at least 1% of guaranteed deposits of all
entities (Official State Bulletin 2015). To fund it, the FROB collected annual ordinary
contribution from entities and branches in Spain of EU entities proportional to their
liabilities, relative to the total liabilities of all entities, and their specific risk profiles.
Law 11/2015 also provided for an early action mechanism that monitored banks in order
to help internally recover institutions that were likely to fail capital requirements. The
supervisors of this process were the Bank of Spain, European Central Bank, or National
Securities Market Commission (Official State Bulletin 2015). This preventative action was
intended to streamline the operations of an entity to reduce risk of insolvency and facilitate
its resolution, if needed, while shifting the burden of financing from the government to the
financial industry itself.
To ensure that bank failures wouldn’t cause systemic issues, the 2015 law also required
contingent resolution plans for entities that were not under the FROB in a scenario where
no public support was available. This law also empowered the FROB to perform capital
increase or reduction operations, amortize capital instruments, or perform internal
recapitalization (Official State Bulletin 2015).
The resolution of a credit institution was pursued when two criteria existed: the credit
institution was unviable or soon would be unviable, and it was in the public interest and
convenience to resolve the institution to maintain financial stability, protect creditors, and
limit external damage. A credit institution was unviable in the following circumstances:
when it breached solvency requirements, its required liabilities exceeded its assets, or it
was unable to fulfill its enforceable obligations in a timely manner—and it could not
remedy these circumstances by use of its own means, private markets, or restructuring aid
(Official State Bulletin 2012).
Resolution proceeded when the entity did not present a restructuring plan or
demonstrated its own unviability, presented an inadequate plan, or did not execute aspects
of the plan within the timeframe established by the Bank of Spain and the FROB. The Bank

bridge bank was not to exceed the value of assets transmitted from the entity or from any other source,
including the financial support it received. The FROB was able to exercise this clause more than once in favor
of more than one bridge bank, as well as transfer assets and liabilities to third parties. The FROB managed the
bridge bank with the objective of selling it or its assets and liabilities within five years when conditions were
appropriate. This sale was to be done under competitive market conditions. The bridge bank ceased to exist
after one year from FROB’s exit, or after all assets and liabilities were sold. This therefore occurred within six
years of its founding, or the FROB liquidated it.
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of Spain began resolution processes by reporting its decision to the FROB, Ministry of
Economy and Competitiveness, and where appropriate, the European Union and European
Banking Authority. The Bank of Spain then designated FROB as administrator of the entity.
Within two months (the Bank of Spain could extend this deadline to six months), the FROB
prepared a resolution scheme for the entity to be approved by the Bank of Spain; the
scheme had to include the reason for resolution, the resolution instruments to be
implemented, the commitments adopted to minimize the use of public resources and
distortion of competition, the financial support measures to be implemented by the deposit
guarantee fund for credit institutions, the economic valuation of the entity and its balance
sheet, the management actions of the capital and subordinated debt instruments to be
carried out, and the maximum execution period (Official State Bulletin 2012). The Bank of
Spain had authority to impose additional requirements on entities under resolution
processes.
The criteria for the resolution of an entity under Law 11/2015 were similar to those in Law
9/2012 with the addition that an entity that was unviable might also be defined as an entity
that needed extraordinary public financial assistance (Official State Bulletin 2015).
Post-FROB III Resolution
After FROB III, the FROB also resolved Caja Rural Mota del Cuervo, Sociedad Cooperativa de
Crédito de Castilla-La Mancha, a small rural credit cooperative that held less than one ten
thousandth of the assets in the Spanish banking system (about €82.55 million). This was
done in 2014 by selling it to Globalcaja in an emergency procedure, without any public
funds, to maintain confidence in the sector. In 2015, due to concerns about money
laundering in an Andorran institution, BPA, the FROB considered intervening in its
subsidiary, Banco Madrid, which had a balance sheet of €1.3 billion. The FROB concluded
that a resolution through restructuring was inappropriate, and this resulted in the only
exercise of the Deposit Guarantee Fund in Spain during the recent financial crisis, and most
payments were executed without any problems. However, the court that was intended to
advise voluntary insolvency procedures for Banco Madrid still has not handed down a
ruling (Ponce Huerta 2019).

III. Evaluation
The IMF assesses the FROB’s activities post-2012 as largely positive, contributing to a
stronger economy, a more stable financial sector, and reduced risk (IMF 2017). The IMF
praises the additions of bail-in restructuring processes, banking reforms, corporate
governance replacements, and overall economic reforms as successful. However, the FROB
still faces losses on Sareb and the possibility of general economic issues.
The European Stability Mechanism, which disbursed a €41.3 billion loan to the FROB in
2012–13, sees the FROB’s subsequent actions as well prepared to define the scope of
necessary measures to repair the banking sector (Strauch 2019). This was done by
including strategies such as improving bank governance, transparency, and supervision, as
well as the creation of Sareb, in addition to capital and funding policies. The ESM and
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European Commission also have supported other Spanish reforms in the labor market as
well as fiscal and pensions reform. Immediate results of the FROB activity were visible in
the quick stabilization of market access in the banking sector, the decrease in funding costs,
and bank consolidations; the number of cajas fell from 45 to two. Banks stabilized
profitability, reduced holdings of nonperforming loans, increased capital, and diminished
exposure to the real estate sector by use of the asset management company, Sareb. Longterm success is seen in Spain’s return to economic growth in 2014, an area in which it
outperformed the euro area average. Employment increases, competitiveness gains,
economic rebalancing, increased exports, and a current account surplus indicate an
economic recovery reflected in rating upgrades and low borrowing costs for Spain.
The FROB created new merged banks that were more solvent and better managed than the
insolvent cajas that preceded them (de Juan 2019). However, more than 10% of banks’
loans were nonperforming as of 2019, and the post-crisis economy still contains lower
volumes of credit. This number had lowered to 4.5% of loans being nonperforming as of
January 2021. De Juan believes that low returns are compounded by the instability caused
by easy monetary policy and deregulation. The restructuring activity was significant, as the
banks that received public support accounted for 18% of total assets (Ponce Huerta 2019).
In 2012, total deposits at Spanish banks amounted to €1.3 trillion, of which €700 billion
was covered by the Deposit Guarantee Fund; of that amount, €250 billion was at banks that
received recapitalization aid.
The EU has concluded that the FROB helped improve the resilience of the banking system
and reduced the risks of financial instability. It notes that emergency recapitalization and
burden sharing for losses are important aspects of FROB’s powers. It also commends the
FROB for adapting to changing international standards. These measures for stability are
balanced with efficiency, as they reduce the potential burden on public finances and the
negative impacts on restructured banks. The restructuring processes of Spanish banks
were timely, occurring less than six months after EU State Aid rules were adopted. This was
key to restoring confidence in the Spanish banking system, and maintaining macrofinancial
stability, in conjunction with European and Spanish policies (EC 2016).
Former FROB Chairman Jaime Ponce Huerta reported in spring 2019 that the FROB’s
ability to repay the Spanish government depends on three factors. First is the pending
divestment of an indirect 61% stake in Bankia, following its merger in BMN, by the legal
deadline of December 2021. This merger has created a bank of about €230 billion in
assets—the aim is to improve recovery value for FROB and private investors (which hold
around 35% of total shares). Second is the performance of Sareb, which is subject to risk
from the performance of the real estate market itself, as well as the rate of divestment and
the ability to absorb assets, high financial costs, and high overheads. Third is the behavior
of guarantees offered by FROB in the divestment process, which, if significantly different
than the expected loss of €2.5 billion, may also affect FROB’s ability to repay its debt.
Though Spain did use a great deal of capital aid (between 5% and 6% of GDP) relative to
other European countries, the profitability and efficiency of Spanish banks has improved
greatly (Ponce Huerta 2019).
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As of December 2016, uncertainty remained about the legal contingencies the FROB faced
on guarantees it had granted to the acquiring institutions of resolved banks, including
those against the ruling by the European Court on the floor clauses of bank mortgage
interest rates, as these potential losses must be absorbed by FROB (IMF 2017).
However, Spain also faces the challenges of high public debt; unemployment that is higher
than the that of the euro area, on average; low productivity; and significant net external
liabilities. Losses from Sareb also have exceeded expectations, and the privatization of
Bankia and cajas reform are still incomplete (EC 2019). Banks also face profitability
pressure from price correction of assets and the low-interest-rate environment. However,
Rolf Strauch, chief economist of the ESM, views Spain as a “European success story in
overcoming the crisis” and is certain in its ability to overcome these challenges. The
Spanish stability program was the first that was supported by the European Stability
Mechanism, and Strauch believes that this intervention demonstrates the ESM’s success in
protecting the euro area (Strauch 2019).
The European Commission remains concerned about the quality of banks’ loan portfolios,
which reflect a nonperforming loan ratio above 10% of total loans, and increases in
foreclosed assets (EC 2016).
On the other hand, Ponce Huerta states that by creating a resolution infrastructure that
focuses on prevention and planning compatible with the European framework and that is
financed by the banks themselves, Spain seeks to avoid the difficulties faced by European
countries due to failing banks in the financial crisis (Ponce Huerta 2019). Spain separates
the supervision authorities from the FROB’s resolution authorities. As shown in Figure 5
below, there are three resolution authorities in Spain; the Bank of Spain and CNMV are
preventative resolution authorities for banks and investment companies, respectively,
while FROB is an executive resolution authority.
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Figure 5: Institutional Architecture of Supervision and Resolution in Spain

Source: Ponce Huerta 2019.

627

Spain – Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB) Capital Injections

IV.

References

Banco de España (BdE). 2015. Report on Banking Supervision in Spain 2014. Madrid: Banco
de España, Eurosistema, July 21, 2015.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BdE%202014.pdf.
———. 2017a. Report on the Financial and Banking Crisis in Spain, 2008-2014.Madrid:
Banco de España, Eurosistema, May 2017.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BdE%202017a.pdf.
———. 2017b. Informative Note about Financial Assistance in the Process of Restructuring
the Spanish Banking System (2009-2016). Madrid: Banco de España, Eurosistema,
September 7, 2017.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/informative-note-about-financial-help-restructuringprocess-spanish-banking-system.
———. 2019. “Briefing Note on Financial Assistance in the Restructuring of the Spanish
Banking System (2009-2018).” Briefing note, November 20, 2019.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/notabe201119en.pdf.
de Juan, Aristóbulo. 2019. “From Good to Bad Bankers: Lessons Learned from a 50-Year
Career in Banking.” Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, March 22, 2019.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/deJuan_onepage.pdf.
Europa Press. 2011. “Noticia Congreso Convalida Decreto Recapitalizar Banca,” March 10,
2011.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/EuropaPress.pdf.
European Commission (EC). 2010. “State Aid: Commission Approves Spanish Restructuring
Aid for Caja Castilla-La Mancha.” Press release, June 29, 2010.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/State_aid__Commission_app
roves_Spanish_restructuring_aid_for_Caja_Castilla-La_Mancha.pdf.
———. 2012. “Spain: Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector Policy
Conditionality.” July 20, 2012.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2012-07-20-spainmou_en.pdf.
———. 2016. Evaluation of the Financial Sector Assistance Programme: Spain, 20122104. Institutional Paper No. 019. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union,
2016.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ip019_en_2.pdf.
———. 2019.Post-Programme Surveillance Report: Spain, Spring 2019. Institutional Paper
No. 106. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, July 2019.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ip106_en_1.pdf.

628

Sankar

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB). n.d. Website: “Annual Accounts.”
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/frob-annual-accounts.
———. 2018. “Annual Report 2018.”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/20190610%20Mactividades
FROB2018_EN.pdf.
———. 2019. 10 Years of FROB, 2009-2019: A Decade for Financial Stability. Madrid: FROB,
March 2019.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/10-years-frob-2009-2019.
Fontevecchia, Agustino. 2012. “Spanish Bank Stress Tests Dramatically Underestimate
Capital Shortfall.” Forbes, June 27, 2012.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Forbes.pdf.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2012a. “Spain: Financial Stability Assessment.” IMF
Country Report No. 12/137, June 2012.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/IMF.pdf.
———. 2012b. “Spain: Safety Net, Bank Resolution, and Crisis Management Framework—
Technical Note.” IMF Country Report No. 12/145, June 2012.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cr12145.pdf.
———. 2017. “Spain: Financial Sector Assessment Program; Technical Note—Impaired
Assets and Nonperforming Loans.” IMF Country Report No. 17/343, November 13, 2017.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cr17343%20(3).pdf.
Official State Bulletin. 1977. “Royal Decree-Law 3047/1977.” November 11, 1977.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/royal-decree-30471977-which-creates-depositguarantee-fund-savings-banks.
———. 2009. “Royal Decree-Law 9/2009.” June 26, 2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/rdl_009_2009.pdf.
———. 2011. “Royal Decree-Law 2/2011.” February 18, 2011.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BOE-A-2011-3254consolidado.pdf.
———. 2012. “Law 9/2012.” November 14, 2012.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BOE-A-2012-14062.pdf.
———. 2015. “Law 11/2015.” June 18, 2015.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BOE-A-2015-6789consolidado.pdf.
Mayer Brown. 2009. “Summary of Government Interventions: Spain.” April 21, 2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/0263fin_Summary_Govern
ment_Interventions_Spain.pdf.

629

Spain – Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB) Capital Injections

Oliver Wyman. 2012. Asset Quality Review and Bottom-Up Stress Test Exercise. Madrid:
Marsh & McLennan Companies. September 28, 2012.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/informe_ow280912e.pdf.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2012. OECD Economic
Surveys: Spain 2012. Paris: OECD Publishing, November 2012.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/OECD%20One%20pager.pd
f.
Ponce Huerta, Jaime. 2019. “FROB in the Restructuring of the Spanish Banking System.
Where It Stands after a Decade of Activity (2009-2019) and Considerations for the Banking
Union.” Financial Stability Review 36 (Spring): 23–44.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FROB_in_the_restructuring.
pdf.
Segovia, Carlos. 2017. “The Government comes to the Rescue of the Bank Rescue Fund with
an Injection.” El Mundo, June 20, 2017.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/El%20Gobierno%20sale%2
0al%20'rescate'%20del%20fondo%20de%20rescate%20bancario%20con%20una%20iny
eccio%CC%81n%20de%203.000%20millones%20_%20Economia%20Home%20_%20EL
%20MUNDO.pdf.
Strauch, Rolf. 2019. “The Spanish Financial Sector Assistance Programme: 7 Years Later.”
Speech delivered at the European Stability Mechanism seminar, Madrid, October 7, 2019.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/The%20Spanish%20Financ
ial%20Sector%20Assistance%20programme_%207%20years%20later%20%20speech%20by%20Rolf%20Strauch%20_%20European%20Stability%20Mechanism.p
df.
Tam, David and Fulmer, Sean. 2021. "Spain: Sociedad de Gestión de Activos procedentes de
la Reestructuración Bancaria (SAREB)," The Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2, 726756. https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss2/30.

V.

Key Program Documents

Legal/Regulatory Guidance
(EC 2012) Spain: Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector Policy Conditionality
Memorandum of Understanding between Spain and the European Commission regarding
FROB.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2012-07-20-spainmou_en.pdf.
(Official State Bulletin 1977) Royal Decree-Law 3047/1977
Law creating Spanish deposit guarantee fund.

630

Sankar

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/royal-decree-30471977-which-creates-depositguarantee-fund-savings-banks.
(Official State Bulletin 2009 ) Royal Decree-law 9/2009
Law establishing FROB.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/rdl_009_2009.pdf.
(Official State Bulletin 2011) Royal Decree-law 2/2011
Law expanding FROB’s powers before the second round of capital injections.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BOE-A-2011-3254consolidado.pdf.
(Official State Bulletin 2012). Official State Bulletin 2012
Law expanding FROB’s powers before the third round of capital injections.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BOE-A-2012-14062.pdf.
(Official State Bulletin 2015)Official State Bulletin 2015
Most recent legal change to FROB and its resolution powers after usage in the financial crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BOE-A-2015-6789consolidado.pdf.
Media Stories
(Europa Press 2011) News Congress Validates Banking Recapitalization Decree
Article on the passage of a law expanding FROB’s powers ahead of the second round of capital
injections
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/EuropaPress.pdf.
(Segovia 2017) The Government comes to the Rescue of the Bank Rescue Fund with an
Injection
Article on the Treasury converting its loan to FROB into equity.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/El%20Gobierno%20sale%2
0al%20'rescate'%20del%20fondo%20de%20rescate%20bancario%20con%20una%20iny
eccio%CC%81n%20de%203.000%20millones%20_%20Economia%20Home%20_%20EL
%20MUNDO.pdf.
(Strauch 2019) The Spanish Financial Sector Assistance Programme: 7 Years Later
Speech by Rolf Strauch on the Spanish assistance in response to the 2008 crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/The%20Spanish%20Financ
ial%20Sector%20Assistance%20programme_%207%20years%20later%20%20speech%20by%20Rolf%20Strauch%20_%20European%20Stability%20Mechanism.p
df.
Reports/Assessments
(BdE 2015) Report on Banking Supervision in Spain 2014
Bank of Spain report on banking supervision in Spain.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BdE%202014.pdf.

631

Spain – Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB) Capital Injections

(BdE 2017a) Report on the Financial and Banking Crisis in Spain, 2008-2014
Bank of Spain report on the banking crisis in Spain.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BdE%202017a.pdf.
(BdE 2017b) Informative Note about Financial Assistance in the Process of Restructuring
the Spanish Banking System (2009-2016)
Note about restructuring in the Spanish banking system.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/informative-note-about-financial-help-restructuringprocess-spanish-banking-system.
(BdE 2019) Briefing Note on Financial Assistance in the Restructuring of the Spanish
Banking System (2009-2018)
Paper on government bank restructuring policies between 2009 and 2018.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/notabe201119en.pdf.
(EC 2016) Evaluation of the Financial Sector Assistance Programme: Spain, 2012-2014
Paper evaluating Spanish financial sector assistance.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ip019_en_2.pdf.
(EC 2019) Post-Programme Surveillance Report: Spain, Spring 2019
European Commission paper on assistance to Spain during the financial crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ip106_en_1.pdf.
(IMF 2012b) Spain: Financial Stability Assessment
International Monetary Fund paper assessing Spain’s financial stability.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/index.php/library/spain-financial-stability-assessment.
(IMF 2012b) Spain: Safety Net, Bank Resolution, and Crisis Management Framework—
Technical Note
International Monetary Fund paper assessing Spain’s crisis management framework.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cr12145.pdf.
(IMF 2017b) Spain: Financial Sector Assessment Program; Technical Note—Impaired
Assets and Nonperforming Loans
International Monetary Fund paper on assessing the health of Spain’s financial sector.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cr17343%20(3).pdf.
(IMF 2017c) Spain: Financial System Stability Assessment
International Monetary Fund paper assessing Spain’s financial stability.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cr17321.pdf.
(IMF 2018) Spain: IMF Staff Concluding Statement of the 2018 Article IV Mission
International Monetary Fund paper assessing Spain’s economy.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Spain_%20IMF%20Staff%2
0Concluding%20Statement%20of%20the%202018%20Article%20IV%20Mission.pdf.
(Mayer Brown 2009) Summary of Government Interventions: Spain
Mayer Brown report on Spain’s financial interventions during the global financial crisis.

632

Sankar

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/0263fin_Summary_Govern
ment_Interventions_Spain.pdf.

633

Spain – Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB) Capital Injections

VI.

Appendixes

Appendix A: FROB Programs between 2009–12 and Sareb’s
Asset Purchases

Source: IMF 2017.
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Appendix B: Chronological Summary of Spanish Interventions
2008–11
Chronological Summary of Spanish Interventions 2008–11
October 10, 2008: Royal Decree-law 6/2008, which created Fondo para la Adquisición de
Activos Financieros (FAAF)
October 10, 2008: Royal Decree-law 1642/2008, which reformed the deposit guarantee
funds
October 13, 2008: Royal Decree-law 7/2008, on urgent financial and economic measures
June 26, 2009: Royal Decree-law 9/2009, which created the Fondo de Reestructuración
Ordenada Bancaria (FROB)
June 29, 2010: Bank of Spain Circular 3/2010, amending Circular 4/2004 (on December
22) on public and reserved financial information standards, and models of financial
statements
July 9, 2010: Royal Decree-law 11/2010, on the reform of the savings bank sector
February 18, 2011: Royal Decree-law 2/2011, on strengthening the solvency requirements
of credit institutions
June 3, 2011: Royal Decree-law 771/2011, modifying Royal Decree-law 216/2008 (on
February 15), on the resources of financial institutions, and Royal Decree-law 2606/1996
(on December 20), about deposit guarantee funds of credit institutions
October 14, 2011: Royal Decree-law 16/2011, reuniting the three deposit guarantee funds.
November 30, 2011: Bank of Spain Circular 5/2011, modifying Circular 4/2004 (on
December 22) about standards for public and reserved financial information and models of
financial statements
Source: (BdE 2017a).
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Appendix C: FROB I Involvements

Source: BdE 2017a.
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Appendix D: Savings Bank Sector and FROB/FGD

Source: BdE 2017a.
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Appendix E: FROB II Support Initially Committed

Source: FROB 2019.
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Appendix F: FROB II Support Injected

Source: FROB 2019.
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Appendix G: FROB Losses
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Note: According to a commenter familiar with FROB, this table reflects a specific situation
as of the end of 2018. The €9.560 billion recoverable amount stated for BFA-Bankia
(footnoted), though the Bank of Spain states as the amount that FROB estimates in its
annual accounts, is not such: €9.560 billion is the accounting value that FROB registered in
its annual accounts, based on the book value of the entity as of December 2018.
Source: BdE 2019.
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Appendix H: FROB Bailouts

Source: FROB 2018.
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Appendix I: Functions of FROB

Source: FROB 2018.
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Appendix J: Timeline of Spanish Banking Sector

Source: EC 2012.
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Appendix K: Timeline of FROB Activities

Source: Ponce Huerta 2019.
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Appendix L: FROB 2009–16 Finances

Source: IMF 2017.

646

Sankar

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

Appendix M: Stress Test Plans for FROB III

Source: BdE 2017a.
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Appendix N: Full Summary of FROB Purchases and Divestments

Source: BdE 2017a.
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